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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS

MIKE GLEASON, Chairman  
WILLIAM A. MUNDELL  
JEFF HATCH-MILLER  
KRISTIN K. MAYES  
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Arizona Corporation Commission

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In the Matter of the Investigation into  
Preferred Carrier Arrangements and  
Other Potentially Anti-competitive  
Practices involving Service to Residential  
or Business Developments

DOCKET NO. T-00000K-04-0927

Accipiter Communications'  
Supplemental Comments Regarding  
Preferred Provider Agreements

Accipiter Communications Inc. ("Accipiter"), by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits these supplemental comments in the above-referenced generic docket ("Generic Docket") and proposes that the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") take certain actions including the adoption of regulations relating to problematic preferred provider agreements/arrangements ("PPAs"). Additionally, in a separate pleading filed contemporaneously herewith, Accipiter has submitted a motion requesting that a procedural conference be scheduled for the purpose of establishing dates for an evidentiary hearing to consider the issues raised in this Generic Docket.

1 **1. Procedural History.**

2 On 23 December 2004 on its own initiative the Commission opened this Generic  
3 Docket in order to examine PPAs and other potentially harmful anti-competitive practices  
4 by telecommunications providers and other entities. The opening of this Generic Docket  
5 was in partial response to the facts and circumstances stemming from the complaint  
6 proceeding captioned *In the Matter of the Formal Complaint of Accipiter Communications,*  
7 *Inc., Against Vistancia Communications, L.L.C., and Cox Arizona Telecom, L.L.C.,* Docket  
8 No. T-03471A-05-0064 (the "Vistancia Complaint Docket"). The Vistancia Complaint  
9 involved alleged anti-competitive practices through the use of PPAs by a competitive local  
10 exchange carrier ("CLEC"). In November of 2005, the corporate parties to the Vistancia  
11 Complaint Docket entered a settlement agreement that does not affect their respective  
12 positions in this Generic Docket. (The Commission's review of that settlement is pending.)  
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14  
15 On 9 March 2005 Commission staff ("Staff") issued its first set of data requests to  
16 various Arizona telecommunications providers in the Generic Docket.

17 On 25 April 2005 Staff filed a Motion to Compel seeking an order directing Cox  
18 Arizona Telecom, LLC ("Cox") to submit its response to Staff's first set of data requests.  
19

20 On 4 May 2005 a procedural conference was held before hearing officer Dwight D.  
21 Nodes regarding Staff's Motion to Compel Cox's response.

22 On 12 March 2007 Staff issued its second set of data requests to various  
23 telecommunications providers.  
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1 On 22 March 2007 Accipiter filed comments in the Generic Docket. On 3 April  
2 2007 AT&T filed its response to Staff's second set of data requests. On 18 April 2007 the  
3 Arizona Local Exchange Carrier Association ("ALECA") filed comments and on 1 May  
4 2007 Qwest filed comments in the Generic Docket.

## 5 **2. Introduction**

6  
7 The only PPAs that are of concern to Accipiter usually take the form of local  
8 exchange carrier ("LEC") agreements that are designed to facilitate the installation of a sole  
9 provider for the initial telecommunications facilities within large new master-planned  
10 communities ("MPCs") in remote unserved areas. A telephone carrier should not be  
11 surreptitiously entering an unserved area under a secret and confidential agreement that all  
12 but guarantees that there will not be it will not have any competition for telecommunication  
13 services within the MPC. In the most problematic PPA for telephone services, the MPC's  
14 developer/funder ("Financier") subsidizes the LEC's facilities. The LEC subsequently  
15 pays its Financier rebates derived from disposing of a percentage of the subscriber revenues  
16 collected from ratepayers in the MPC. The rebates continue as a perennial encumbrance;  
17 they are not conditioned on mere repayment of a loan approved by the Commission. The  
18 magnitude of the payments depends on the efficacy of the Financier's efforts to keep  
19 competition out of the MPC. Through these PPAs the LEC is paying others to do what at  
20 the very least be inappropriate for the LEC to do itself; exclude the competition to the  
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1 everlasting mutual benefit of both the preferred provider and the Financier. This stream of  
2 payments for protection from competition must not be condoned.

3 As a solution Accipiter is not proposing that PPAs be eliminated through some form  
4 of all-encompassing blanket regulation prohibiting their use. Instead, the Commission  
5 should consider the desirability of full public disclosure before a PPA can take effect:

6  
7 • The Commission should be informed by public filing about a pending PPA  
8 including the long-term financing aspects and other evidence of any encumbrance or  
9 disposition of an asset;

10 • The consumers should be made aware of the role their own payments have in  
11 hindering competition in their MPCs by informing them of the amounts of their phone or  
12 homeowners' association dues payments that are being funneled by preferred providers to  
13 Financiers; and  
14

15 • The ILEC and other competitive telephone providers should be informed of all  
16 terms in PPAs making them aware of the embedded economic disincentives in Arizona's  
17 numerous MPC developments and allowing them to make informed business decisions  
18 about new investments.

19  
20 Through this Generic Docket the Commission's examination in detail of the more  
21 problematic PPAs utilized in remote unserved areas can be expected to reveal how  
22 competition is destroyed as follows:

1 1) Non-tariffed covert terms are concealed from potential competitors effectively  
2 suppressing competition in MPCs;

3 2) Consumers are unaware that their telephone provider shares with the Financier  
4 their ongoing monthly payments as an incentive to hinder consumer choice;

5 3) The safeguards ordered by the Commission to prevent a CLEC from creating a  
6 monopoly in a previously unserved area are evaded;

7 4) Long-term encumbrances of preferred provider assets/revenues are created;

8 5) The concept of "public utility easement" is flouted under a bogus claim of  
9 protecting private property rights; and  
10

11 6) The critical "first mover" advantage is bestowed on the preferred provider as part  
12 of a foundation for construction of a *de facto* monopoly.  
13

14 Unlike many other states, the Arizona Corporation Commission already has  
15 sufficient authority to address the abuses presented by problematic PPAs. Accipiter has  
16 outlined the Commission's authority in section 4 below. We also respond to the concerns  
17 of Qwest *et al.*, who have been otherwise supportive. Importantly no new regulatory  
18 scheme is required. Instead, a policy of openness and public disclosure is the key.  
19

20 **3. Secrecy Begins the Process of Keeping Out Competition.**

21 A meaningful inquiry into PPAs in Arizona is not an easy task. With a self  
22 proclaimed need for secrecy, the telephone providers that use PPAs impose ignorance on  
23 the Commission, on consumers and on competing telephone providers. LECs that enter  
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1 into PPAs usually claim that their agreements contain confidential information, proprietary  
2 marketing strategies and other sensitive business data. They cloak PPAs in secrecy by  
3 requiring that the terms be kept confidential. For example Cox Arizona Telecom demands  
4 that anyone who has reason to view such an agreement must first execute an onerous  
5 confidentiality agreement before any terms of its PPAs are discussed or divulged. This  
6 very effectively prevents public exploration of what is really going on inside these secret  
7 agreements.  
8

9 Accipiter considers public input to be critical to the Commission's ability to  
10 discharge its duties. However, the preferred provider keeps the public in the dark. Without  
11 public knowledge of the various terms included in problematic PPAs and knowledge of  
12 what is really going on with these agreements, it is futile to take public comment. To begin  
13 a public discussion of the issues, Accipiter offer the following description of a PPA  
14 recently provided to the Commission by one of the Arizona CLECs that regularly employs  
15 secret or "confidential" PPAs. In the Vistancia Complaint docket Cox explained to the  
16 Commission "what actually transpired" in a PPA negotiation:  
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18 The Commission must understand what actually transpired  
19 between the parties. The Vistancia development is  
20 somewhat remote from the then-existing communication  
21 services facilities. Naturally, the Developer wanted a variety  
22 of communications services available for its first homeowner  
23 and to every homeowner thereafter, even though the  
24 population would be insufficient in the beginning to support  
25 the cost of extending services to the entire community. As  
26 this Commission well knows, the Valley is undergoing  
amazing growth, and Cox has many options from which to

1 choose when deciding where to invest its limited capital  
2 resources. Thus, it is not surprising that, when the  
3 Developer approached Cox to discuss communications  
4 services for this Vistancia development, Cox was simply  
5 unwilling, without some financial incentives, to make the  
6 enormous capital expenditures necessary to ensure that  
7 services were available to the first homeowner. Cox  
8 calculated what it believed would be an acceptable rate of  
9 return on its capital investment, as well as the costs of  
10 extending services to the development, and determined what  
11 capital contribution and other incentives from the Developer  
12 were necessary to make Cox's investment reasonable from a  
13 business standpoint. The Developer agreed to make this  
14 capital contribution and to provide certain marketing  
15 incentives. However, the Developer recognized that, at some  
16 point, Cox would more than recoup its capital contribution,  
17 and also wanted to recoup its capital investment, share in the  
18 benefits that Cox derived from having access to the  
19 Developer's property and be compensated for its marketing  
20 efforts on behalf of Cox. Thus, the parties agreed to a  
21 revenue-sharing arrangement whereby, once sufficiently high  
22 levels of penetration were achieved, the Developer could  
23 recoup some of its capital contribution and participate in the  
24 revenue derived from Cox's sale of communications services  
25 at the development. There was never the necessary intent to  
26 form or the attributes of a profit-and-loss-sharing joint  
venture.

17 *Cox Arizona Telcom, LLC's Reply to Staff Response Regarding Accipiter*  
18 *Complaint* (Public Version), Docket No. T-03471A-05-0064, docketed  
May 31, 2005.

19 Cox describes its PPAs as negotiated financial arrangements through which it  
20 obtains the capital it needs to extend its network into new MPCs. According to Cox, it  
21 offers a mechanism for the Financier to recover its capital only if certain levels of market  
22 penetration are achieved. The funding is recovered by the Financier only when elevated  
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1 market penetration levels are reached with the amount of each payment resting on a  
2 predetermined percentage of the ratepayer revenues.

3 To Accipiter's knowledge, and under pressure from the Commission, Cox has only  
4 once allowed public disclosure of its PPAs in Arizona. That was in the Vistancia  
5 Complaint Docket. In preparation for a hearing in that docket, Cox publicly filed copies of  
6 its Co-marketing Agreement and its Property Access Agreement, both dated April 8, 2003.  
7 See Exhibits LT1 and LT2 to the Direct Testimony of Lynda Trickey, docketed April 5,  
8 2006, *In the Matter of the Formal Complaint of Accipiter Communications, Inc., Against*  
9 *Vistancia Communications, L.L.C., and Cox Arizona Telecom, L.L.C.*, Docket No. T-  
10 03471A-05-0064. In those PPAs Cox contracted to kickback a percentage share of its  
11 revenues to the Financier on an escalating scale ranging from 3 percent up to 20 percent  
12 depending on the type of service and on the market penetration achieved. From Accipiter's  
13 viewpoint, these PPAs are nothing less than contracts to pay others to do what may be  
14 unlawful (or at least inappropriate) for Cox itself to do—exclude the competition.  
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16  
17 However, even if we accept Cox's peculiar contention that it does not enter into  
18 PPAs to exclude competition (which Accipiter does not accept), it is clear from this brief  
19 description that Cox treats PPAs as a form of non-recourse financing where the Financier  
20 (who controls the MPC) is granted what is typically referred to as an "equity kicker" in the  
21 project. Also the Financier is compensated for the efficacy of its efforts to exclude  
22 competition thereby increasing the market penetration for the preferred provider which then  
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1 increases the payment stream to the Financier. In other words, the better the Financier  
2 keeps out the competition, the higher the capital returns to the Financier, the higher the  
3 capital cost to the preferred provider, and the fewer and more expensive choices for the  
4 consumers. A public service corporation in Arizona is not supposed to encumber its gross  
5 revenues without a Commission order. It is inappropriate at best for a LEC to accept secret  
6 funding and encumber its revenues to pay off a Financier for decades to come founded on  
7 how effectively competition is stifled.  
8

9 **4. This Is Not A Call For A New Far-Reaching Regulatory Scheme—The Commission**  
10 **Already Has the Power.**

11 In Arizona the needed laws and regulatory powers are already in place to deal  
12 properly and appropriately with problem PPAs. Since these agreements are usually kept  
13 secret, outside parties (including the consumers) have no idea what they are encountering;  
14 they are unaware of the high economic barriers that have been erected to hinder the entry of  
15 competitive telecommunications services into Arizona's numerous MPCs. These three  
16 simple informative steps would harness the self-corrective forces inherent in open  
17 competitive markets to bear against the more problematic aspects of PPAs:  
18

- 19 1) inform the Commission,
- 20 2) inform the consumers, and
- 21 3) inform the potential competitors.

22 Through this approach Accipiter believes that many of the unwanted anti-  
23 competitive aspects of problematic PPAs can be significantly commuted in Arizona while  
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1 at the same time maintaining open, robust and innovative competition between telephone  
2 service providers with a minimal amount of regulatory oversight.

3 Under the Arizona Constitution Article 15, Sections 3, 4, and 6, the Commission  
4 already has the responsibility and power to review and regulate preferred provider  
5 agreements. More specifically under Arizona Statutes A.R.S. §§ 40-285 the Commission is  
6 also slated with the responsibility to address the peculiar use of PPAs as unauthorized  
7 encumbrances and dispositions of LEC facilities and systems.  
8

9 Under Article 15 of Arizona Constitution the Commission has plenary power to  
10 regulate the conduct of business of public service corporations in this state. Article 15,  
11 section 3 of the Arizona Constitution provides: "The Corporation Commission shall have  
12 full power to, and shall . . . make reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, by which  
13 [public service]corporations shall be governed in the transaction of business within the  
14 State, and may prescribe the forms of contracts and the systems of keeping accounts to be  
15 used by such corporations in transacting such business, and make and enforce reasonable  
16 rules, regulations, and orders for the convenience, comfort, and safety. . . of the . . . patrons  
17 of such corporations . . . ." By anyone's definition PPAs are contracts involving the  
18 transaction of public service corporation business within Arizona. Our State Constitution  
19 Article 15, section 3 grants the Commission direct authority to regulate PPAs. Also Article  
20 Article 15, section 4 of the Arizona constitution provides: "The Corporation Commission, and the  
21 several members thereof, shall have the power to inspect and investigate the property,  
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1 books, papers, business, methods, and affairs . . . of any public service corporation doing  
2 business within the State . . . .” PPAs are part of the books, papers, business, methods, and  
3 affairs of public service corporations. Therefore, the Commission has the power to address  
4 PPAs.

5  
6 Additionally, the Commission’s powers may be extended by statute under Article  
7 15, section 6, of the Arizona Constitution: “The law-making power may enlarge powers  
8 and extend the duties of the Corporation Commission . . . .” If the direct constitutional  
9 grant of power to the Commission were not enough to provide ample authority to regulate  
10 PPAs (and it is), the Legislature by statute assured the vesting of the authority and the  
11 obligation to address PPAs as they are being used in Arizona today.

12  
13 Under A.R.S. § 40-285(A) a public service corporation shall not encumber any part  
14 of its plant or system without Commission authorization:

15 A public service corporation shall not sell, lease, assign,  
16 mortgage or otherwise dispose of or encumber the whole or  
17 any part of its railroad, line, plant, or system necessary or  
18 useful in the performance of its duties to the public, or any  
19 franchise or permit or any right hereunder, nor shall such  
20 corporation merge such system or any part thereof with any  
21 other public service corporation without first having secured  
22 from the commission an order authorizing it so to do. Every  
23 such disposition, encumbrance or merger made other than in  
24 accordance with the order of the commission authorizing it is  
25 void.

26 A.R.S. § 40-285(A).

1 As described by Cox, PPAs encumber and otherwise siphon off and assign away a  
2 share of the revenues from entire areas or MPC subsets of the LECs systems and customer  
3 base for decades.

4 The legislature further recognizes the Commission's jurisdiction over financing of a  
5 public service company and even mandates that the Commission review the debts of any  
6 public service companies incorporated in Arizona. A public service corporation's right "to  
7 issue stocks and stock certificates, bonds, notes and other evidence of indebtedness," is a  
8 "special privilege" with control vested in the State and "exercised as provided by law and  
9 under rules, regulations and orders of the Commission." A.R.S. § 40-301(A) (emphasis  
10 added). Under A.R.S. § 40-301(B), an Arizona public service corporation is not even  
11 allowed to issue evidence of indebtedness unless it is first "authorized by an order of the  
12 Commission." This is a legislative acknowledgement of the Commission's authority to  
13 address debts, an authority that is mandated with regard to instate public service  
14 companies.  
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17 The statutory criteria for approving a request to issue additional indebtedness is also  
18 helpful when considering PPAs that are often used as a form of financing for the LEC. In  
19 A.R.S. § 40-301(C) it states, "The commission shall not make any order . . . granting any  
20 application [to issue evidences of indebtedness] unless it finds that such issue is for lawful  
21 purposes which are within the corporate powers of the applicant, are compatible with the  
22 public interest, with sound financial practices, and with the proper performance by the  
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1 applicant of service as a public service corporation and will not impair his ability to  
2 perform that service.” (Emphasis added.) As the Commission explores and considers  
3 PPAs, it may be helpful to weigh these same criteria.

4       Moreover, there is precedent for the Commission’s review and approval of PPAs.  
5 To Accipiter’s knowledge, the only PPAs that have been reviewed by the Commission  
6 were subject to regulatory proceedings and approved by an order of the Commission.  
7 These are the two agreements that USWest (now Qwest) entered into with the developers  
8 of the Civano and Anthem MPCs. *See*, Commission Decision No. 61626, Docket Nos. T-  
9 01051B-98-0708, T-01051B-98-0731 & T-01051B-99-0057 (docketed May 1, 1999). In  
10 hindsight one may question the wisdom of the extension fee waiver being linked to market  
11 penetration, but at least that early attempt to review and regulate PPAs did not create a  
12 revenue encumbrance or kickback scheme funneling funds back to the Financier far into  
13 the future. In Arizona these schemes are currently employed without any authority from  
14 the Commission.

15       One CLEC recently claimed to the Commission that its PPAs with these kickback  
16 schemes are merely what the Commission already approved in the Civano and Anthem  
17 dockets. However, there are huge differences between what Accipiter is encountering  
18 today and what was approved by the Commission for USWest in 1999, not the least of  
19 which is granting the Financier a rebate in the form of revenue splitting as an equity kicker  
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1 in the long-term revenue stream paid by consumers of telecommunications services and the  
2 resulting corruption of the public utility easement concept.

3 The Commission has both the jurisdiction and the responsibility to address PPAs as  
4 they are currently being used by LECs in this state.

5  
6 **5. Accipiter's Ignorance Should Not be the Commission's Ignorance.**

7 Accipiter cannot imagine any circumstances that would justify Commission  
8 approval of a financing scheme that allows a carrier to reward a Financier in ever-  
9 increasing amounts on the footing of how effectively the Financier has stifled competition!

10 Accipiter is left to stumble over PPAs in its service area by happenstance. The  
11 parties that are utilizing a PPA do not publicly announce when it is created. Accipiter does  
12 not even know if it is aware of all of the PPAs in its service area. Typically the existence  
13 of a PPA is not revealed to Accipiter until an MPC approaches the construction phase and  
14 Accipiter requests access to the PUEs. At that time the existence of a PPA is revealed by  
15 the parties in an effort to persuade Accipiter to abandon voluntarily the service area.  
16 Supposedly any attempt to offer competing services where a PPA is in place would be too  
17 onerous a task for any competing telephone provider to consider seriously. Accipiter's  
18 knowledge of the terms included in PPAs is often severely limited or in some cases may be  
19 nonexistent. The parties to these agreements claim that confidentiality clauses in their  
20 PPAs conveniently prohibit disclosure of the terms.<sup>1</sup>

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24 <sup>1</sup>. For example, Cox conceals its plans for expansion of its service area despite the  
25 Commission's express requirement in Decision No. 60285 (July 2, 1997) that granted  
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1 Admittedly Accipiter's experience with PPAs is limited to its rural service area  
2 which is less than one percent of the State's area. The preferred provider and the Financier  
3 try to keep Accipiter in the dark, but Accipiter does not believe the Commission should be  
4 deliberately deprived of operative facts for the other ninety-nine plus percent of Arizona.  
5 The Commission is entitled to have the benefit of informed comment in this Generic  
6 Docket from all interested groups regarding these agreements to keep out competition. To  
7 be effective, the comment and input must include not only the parties that want to enter into  
8 such agreements; it should include any LECs that may want to offer competing services;  
9 and it most certainly should include the consumers that are ultimately paying the price for  
10 rewarding efforts to deprive consumers of the choice of providers, competing technologies,  
11 competing tariffs and other benefits that are fundamental to a robust competitive market for  
12 telephone services. This means no confidentiality provisions may be allowed to hide secret  
13 payments to exclude competition, no matter how sensitive or embarrassing a preferred  
14 provider may consider that information to be.  
15  
16

17 **6. Agreements To Keep Out Competition are Effective.**

18 PPAs can be amazingly effective at keeping out the competition. The PPAs  
19 described herein are unique financing instruments that obligate a public service company to  
20 rebate significant amounts of cash for many years into the future. These agreements  
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23 Cox's application for a Competitive CC&N where Cox was ordered to provide advance  
24 notice of the specific territories where it intends to provide telephone service. As a result,  
25 Accipiter has no notice of where Cox may be heading next.  
26

1 normally are void unless approved pursuant to an order of the Commission. A.R.S. 40-  
2 285(A).

3 Without any review or approval by the Commission, this PPA concept has been  
4 stretched into extended kickback schemes set up to purchase protection for its territory for  
5 decades. Under these forms of PPAs, the Financier continues to be paid year after year to  
6 keep out the competition.  
7

8 Experience demonstrates the power of these fabricated revenue streams to exclude  
9 competition. The major LECs including former Bell operating companies like Qwest and  
10 AT&T (formerly SBC) have demonstrated that they abandon MPCs that fall under these or  
11 similar kinds of PPAs. Qwest gave up its opposition to Accipiter's request to transfer  
12 Qwest territory within Vistancia only after it became clear that Cox had already entered  
13 into a PPA. Other examples of ILEC abandonment can be found in the materials that  
14 AT&T submitted in response to Staff's Second Set of Data Requests in this docket. In its  
15 response AT&T identified two regulatory petitions that it filed within the past year with the  
16 Florida Public Service Commission. AT&T requested to be relieved of its carrier of last  
17 resort ("COLR") obligations in two MPCs that AT&T contended were so onerous as to  
18 make the ILEC's entry into those markets uneconomic. The PPA bestows on the preferred  
19 provider the invaluable "first-mover" advantage, another sturdy component in building a *de*  
20 *facto* monopoly. Consumer choice between competing telecommunications services  
21 providers and technologies should not be determined by which carrier can furtively fashion  
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1 the largest long-term revenue stream paid to a Financier, but this appears by stealth to have  
2 become the pattern in Arizona today.

3 Accipiter has run into significant obstacles in all of the four MPCs in its service  
4 territory and will offer testimony on this subject. This past winter Accipiter began meeting  
5 with the developer of Sun City Festival ("SCF"). Accipiter representatives have attended  
6 weekly onsite utility coordination meetings since January. Even with these coordination  
7 efforts, on April 23, 2007, Accipiter learned (from another LEC) that the Wickenburg  
8 School District and its architect had been told by the CLEC and the developer that there  
9 was no other phone company in SCF and that the CLEC was their only choice for service.  
10 The CLEC's lone service was set to be discussed the next morning at a pre-construction  
11 meeting with the School District, the CLEC and the developer. Accipiter contacted SCF  
12 and was informed that Accipiter could not provide service to the planned new school  
13 facilities because the trenches were already closed, the streets paved and the landscaping in  
14 place. On closer inspection it was apparent that the existing state of construction was not  
15 nearly as advanced as the developer portrayed.  
16

17  
18 Cox contends that its tardy decision to enter the Anthem market (where USWest was  
19 the preferred provider) demonstrates that even when Cox is not the preferred provider,  
20 market entry by a competitor into a PPA area is possible. However, if the developer at  
21 Anthem was being paid millions of dollars for decades into the future to continue efforts to  
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1 exclude competition, Cox's tardy offer of competing services in that MPC would most  
2 likely have been undermined or never attempted.

3 **7. Public Utility Easements are a Public right.**

4       Accipiter echoes Qwest's concerns regarding overreaching regulation. Accipiter  
5 agrees with Qwest that the problem is not with access arrangements to multi-dwelling units  
6 or with single owner multi-tenant commercial buildings. Accipiter also points out that the  
7 legislature recently enacted A.R.S. §§ 33-2301 & 2302 protecting commercial building  
8 owners' rights to select providers that are allowed access to their buildings. Accipiter  
9 commends and has no quarrel with that political decision protecting private property rights.  
10 MPCs typically convert privately owned vacant land to public streets with public utility  
11 easements ("PUEs") to allow access to and subsequent sale of homes, buildings and lots to  
12 the public. After declaring the intent to create a public subdivision (but technically prior to  
13 the full public dedication and acceptance by a municipality) PPAs are used to exclude  
14 competition by hindering access (under a fake claim of private property rights) while the  
15 MPC is under construction. Thus PPAs in effect are used to stymie competing providers  
16 from access to the trenches that are all the while fully intended to be PUEs. Under these  
17 PPAs the decisions as to which provider is ultimately allowed to serve a consumer and  
18 which providers are excluded from the premises are not made by the homeowner and  
19 consumer of the service. Instead the choice between providers is clandestinely imposed on  
20 the buyers in the MPC.  
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1 Qwest also confirms that public utility easements are a hollow gesture without the  
2 cooperation and notice needed to allow competing providers to install their facilities along  
3 with the other utilities and before the trenches are closed. Accipiter also agrees with  
4 Qwest's concern that marketing arrangements with developers may serve a legitimate  
5 purpose in a competitive market for telecommunication services. Finally, private  
6 communications easements through public right-of ways should be prohibited.  
7

8 **8. There Should Be Commission Hearings to Address Secretive (Covert) PPAs.**

9 Covert PPAs must not be permitted further to hinder competition in Arizona through  
10 innovative financing arrangements where the Financier in control of the MPC is paid to  
11 exclude competition. These PPAs are evidence of encumbrances and dispositions and  
12 should be evaluated by the Commission and treated as such. How many millions of dollars  
13 are Arizona LECs going to rebate under PPAs? How many more millions of dollars will be  
14 paid out for efforts to exclude competition before these contract debts will be paid?  
15 Accipiter does not know the answers to these questions, but the answers should be provided  
16 to the Commission through evidentiary hearings in this Generic Docket which was wisely  
17 and expressly initiated by the Commission for these purposes.  
18

19  
20 **9. Conclusion**

21 Consumers should be afforded the opportunity for choice of telecommunications  
22 providers, technologies, services and tariffs. PPAs that are fashioned to pay others to  
23 destroy competition are repugnant to maintaining a true marketplace. Accipiter believes  
24  
25  
26

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1 that through evidentiary hearings in this Generic Docket, the various issues can be fully  
2 explored and regulations can be adopted to safeguard competition and customer choice.

3 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2007.  
4

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6

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1 Original & 13 copies filed  
2 this 17<sup>th</sup> day of July 2007 with:

3 Docket Control  
4 Arizona Corporation Commission  
5 1200 West Washington Street  
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7 A copy of the foregoing was mailed  
8 this 17<sup>th</sup> day of July 2007 to:

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